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Abstract
Are natural resources a source of conict or stability? Empirical
studies demonstrate that rents from natural resources, and in particu-
lar oil, are an important source of civil war. Allegedly, resource rents
attract rent seekers, which destabilize society. However, there is a large
literature on how so-called rentier states manage to pacify opposition
groups by handing out special favors. The present paper attempts
to bridge the gap between the rent-seeking view of resource rents as
a source of conict and the rentier state view which emphasizes the
role of resource rents in promoting peace and stability, and show how
one may lead to the other. The mechanism that we highlight relies
on the notion that higher rents may activate more interest groups in
a power struggle. We demonstrate that the associated increased cost
of conict may in fact promote social stability. The peaceful solution
is upheld by a self reinforcing transfer program, in the form of pa-
tronage employment. The chance of conict and rent dissipation in
our model is highest for intermediate levels of resource rents, where
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the government cannot make credible commitments to the opposition
groups.
JEL classications: D74, Q34
Keywords: Rent seeking, rentier states, resource rents, conict,
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1 Introduction
A number of empirical papers, pioneered by Collier and Hoe­ er, show that
the risk of civil war increases with natural resource endowment.1 The main
argument is that income from natural resources provides greedy rent seekers
with both the means and the motive to ght.2 In contrast to these ndings,
however, there is a large literature on how rentier states have been able to
pacify opposition groups by targeted transfer programs.3 There is thus a
tension between the rent-seeking and the rentier state views on how resource
rents shape societies.
Surprisingly, we are not aware of any theoretical paper addressing this
tension, and the present paper aims at bridging this gap in the literature.
We propose a very simple, yet, we believe, intuitively appealing mechanism,
which incorporates both the conict-triggering and the cooperation-inducing
e¤ects of resource rents. In fact, we show how the greed mechanism of the
rent seeking thesismay itself generate the patronage-based regime stability
of the rentier state thesisfor high levels of rent.
The core causal mechanism underlying our results is based on the assump-
tion that the incumbent government cannot make binding commitments on
transfers to the opposition (Azam, 1995, Fearon, 1995, Powell, 2006). An
1See Collier and Hoe­ er (1998, 2004) and Collier, Hoe­ er, Rohner (2009). Fearon and
Laitin (2003) have challenged the robustness of the ndings by Collier et al, but do nd
that oil rents are robustly linked to civil war.
2For an overview of the mechanisms proposed in the literature on resource rents and
civil war, see Ross (2004) and Humphreys (2005).
3Important contributions here include Beblawi and Luciani (1987), Karl (1997), Herbst
(2000), Le Billon (2003), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Smith (2004), Fjelde (2009).
Consistent with this literature, Collier and Hoe­ er (1998, 2004) and Collier, Hoe­ er,
Rohne (2009) nd that resource rents beyond a certain threshold level reduce the risk
of conict. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) and Basedau and Lay (2009) nd a similar,
hump-shaped relation between conict and resource dependence and oil wealth, respec-
tively. Similarly, Ross (2004) concludes that resoure rents in some cases have facilitated
cooperation between interest groups.
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increase in resource rents may lend credibility to the transfer program by
making it more costly for the government to renege on its promises. This
takes place when increased resource rents induce more groups to enter a
power struggle with the incumbent government. In this way, depending on
the circumstances, resource rents can both trigger conict by greedy rent
seekers and promote peace by lending credibility to a program of patronage
payments.
In terms of modelling strategy, our paper is related to Aslaksen and Torvik
(2006), who consider the choice between war and peace in a society consisting
of two interest groups. As in our study, peace is the result of a self-reinforcing
equilibrium, supported by a trigger strategy in case of deviation, and war is
specied as a standard rent-seeking contest. But while we focus on redis-
tribution in the form of patronage employment, Aslaksen and Torvik let
income distribution in the peaceful equilibrium be dened by a democratic
process, with election outcomes determined by probabilistic voting. Most im-
portantly, resource rents in their model monotonically reduce the chance of
peace, while the main ambition of our paper is to demonstrate that resource
rents in some cases may promote peace.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model, starting with describing the conict equilibrium and then moving
on to cooperation. We then analyze the equilibrium outcome of the model.
Section 3 adds extensions to the basic model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
There are three groups in society, a, b, and c. We can think of the groups as
ethnic groups, geographically concentrated in di¤erent parts of the country.
Group a is the incumbent, controlling the rents (R) and the transfer policy.
The opposition can be involved in one out of three activities: private sector
employment, which gives an exogenously given income w, rent-seeking, with
prot , and public sector employment, with a compensation g determined
by the government.
The government jobs are entirely unproductive, and serve only a political
purpose, namely the transfer of resources to the opposition groups to ensure
their loyalty.4 We do not consider simple cash transfers as they can be used
4Patronage employment in the bureaucracy or parastatals has been used extensively
in developing (and developed) countries, see the cases mentioned in Robinson et al (2006)
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by the opposition to nance a rebellion. In contrast, by accepting a public
sector job, opposition leaders are physically placed under the scrutiny of the
incumbent government and thereby commit themselves not to challenge the
incumbent as long as they remain public sector employees. In contrast, if
the leaders of the opposition groups are not employed by the government,
they may choose to challenge the incumbent. In that case, there is conict,
modelled as a standard rent seeking contest à la Tullock (1980). We can
think about conict as a winner takes all game, or the ght over shares
of the rent. Since rebellions rarely lead to revolutions, we prefer the latter
interpretation.
The sequence of moves is as follows. First, the government decides on
whether or not to o¤er public sector employment to the opposition. Second,
the opposition groups decide on whether to work in the private sector, to
rebel, or to accept public sector employment (if such is o¤ered). Since prots
under rent-seeking depend on the number of rent-seekers, it may be protable
for one opposition group to rebel but not for both. Since the two opposition
groups are identical, it is immaterial who rebels and who stays out. For
concreteness, without loss of generality we can assume that group b moves
before group c. Third, the government decides on whether or not to actually
pay public sector employees. Fourth, if the public sector employees are not
paid, this triggers conict in all subsequent periods.
Using the logic of backward induction, we rst calculate prots under
conict, and then move on to the governments decision on whether to pay
the transfers or not.
2.1 Conict payo¤s
The income in the rent-seeking scenario depends on whether one or both
opposition groups challenge the incumbent. In case only one chooses to
battle (say group b), the prot of each ghting party i is given by:
di =
qi
qa + qb
R  qi; (1)
where qi is the rent seeking e¤ort by group i = a; b. If both opposition groups
challenge, the prot of each ghting group i = a; b; c is given by:
di =
qi
qa + qb + qc
R  qi: (2)
and for a more in depth study of Africa, see Tangri (1999).
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Maximizing with respect to qi, and using the symmetry of the groups, we
nd that each ghting groups rent-seeking e¤ort in the duopoly is given by:
qd =
1
4
R; (3)
which, using qi = qd in (1), results in equilibrium duopoly prots:
d =
1
4
R: (4)
If both groups challenge, the equilibrium rent seeking e¤ort is
qt =
2
9
R; (5)
which, using qi = qt in (1), results in equilibrium triopoly prots:
t =
1
9
R: (6)
Evidently, prots are lower under triopoly competition than under duopoly
competition (t < d) for any given level of rents R. This observation is key
for our analysis. It implies that the market structure of conict depends on
the level of the resource rent. In particular, an opposition group will only
be willing to challenge the incumbent if the payo¤ from conict exceeds the
private sector income w. The observation that the intensity of rent-seeking
depends on the number of rent-seeking groups is of course a standard result
from the rent-seeking literature. However, its role in providing credibility to
a governments transfer program, which is our main concern here, is novel.
It is useful to distinguish between three cases, dened by the level of rents
relative to private sector income:
Denition 1 Let d < w , R < 4w  Rd denote the "low-rents" case,
characterized by an unchallenged incumbent.
If the private sector income is higher than the prots that can be made by
challenging the incumbent, the opposition groups will remain passive. Next,
there is an intermediate level of rents where it is protable for one, and only
one, group (say, group b) to challenge the government, resulting in duopoly
conict:
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Denition 2 Let d > w > t , R 2 (4w; 9w) denote the "intermediate-
rents" case, characterized by duopoly conict.
Finally, the case where both groups would nd it protable to challenge
the incumbent, leading to triopoly conict, is given by the high rentscase:
Denition 3 Let t > w , R > 9w  Rt denote the "high-rents" case,
characterized by triopoly conict.
From the above discussion we can conclude that:
Lemma 1 Higher rent leads to entry of more contenders in the battle for re-
sources, and increases the intensity of conict for any given market structure
of conict.
Proof. This follows directly from Rd < Rt, @q
i
@R
> 0 obtained from Denitions
1-3, and from (3) and (5).
Note that di¤erent rent-regimes dened above always consider rents rel-
ative to private sector income levels. Hence, a poor country with a very low
w can be considered a high rent country even if its resource rents in absolute
terms are lower than those in a wealthy country.
2.2 The credibility of transfers
For low rents (R < Rd), the incumbent is unchallenged, captures the entire
rent and a peaceful solution prevails. For rents above this level, the incum-
bent depends on transfers to avoid conict. These transfers, in the form of
patronage employment, must match the groupsprot from conict, that is
gd = d and gt = t for intermediate rents (duopoly) and high rents (triopoly)
respectively. Note that the patronage jobs must be o¤ered to both groups
in all cases, even when there is only room for protable entry by one under
intermediate rents, in order to prevent entry by the second group. Finally,
since d > t public sector payments as a share of rents are in fact higher in
the intermediate rents-scenario than in the high rents-scenario.
The government may promise lucrative jobs in the public sector, but does
not necessarily have an incentive to live up to its promises. In the absence of
a credible commitment technology, the patronage employment program must
be self-reinforcing. Only if the short-term gain from deviation is dominated
by the long term loss of conict, will the transfers be credible and hence
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relevant for promoting peace. In the model, a government that reneges on its
promised redistribution program unchallenged keeps all rents for one period,
but automatically faces a rent seeking challenge in all subsequent periods
(Garnkle,1990).
To determine whether the incumbent has an incentive to deviate from
the announced transfer scheme or not, we need to investigate the cost of
deviation, which in turn depends on the rent seeking market structure. Will
deviation lead to a challenge from both opposition groups or only one group?
As explained above, the answer to this question depends on the size of the
rent relative to the income level in the private sector. For low rents, no
transfers are needed, so we need only focus on the case of intermediate and
high rents.
2.2.1 Intermediate rents
In this scenario, patronage employment must be rewarded at gd = d. Ex
ante, the incumbent clearly prefers transfers to ght. This can be seen from
the fact that his income net of transfers (d to each opposition group) is given
by R 2d while conict leads to prots d. Given (4), transfers therefore give
a net benet of 1
4
R. Adhering to the transfer program gives the incumbent
a net present value of prots given by:
d =
1
1  
 
R  2d : (7)
However, the transfer program is not necessarily credible. To demonstrate
this, note that the incumbents prots from reneging on the promise, once
the opposition groups have chosen public sector employment (and therefore
cannot organize any opposition or, for that matter, carry out private sector
work in that period), is R in the rst period, and then the rent seeking payo¤
d in all remaining periods. The net present value of prots to the incumbent
from deviation is thus:
ddev = R +

1  
d: (8)
We observe that:
ddev = 
d ,  = 2
3
 d: (9)
Only if the degree of patience exceeds the critical level d will the in-
cumbent choose to live up to its promise given by the compensation scheme
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d to each opposition party under patronage employment. We can therefore
conclude that:
Lemma 2 For intermediate rents (Rd < R < Rt), for all   d the trans-
fer program is credible, resulting in an equilibrium with social stability. For
 < d, the program is not credible and will be rejected, leading to (duopoly)
conict.
2.2.2 High rents
In this scenario, public sector pay is given by gt = t. The ex ante gains to
the incumbent of pacifying the opposition through patronage employment is
now even larger than in the intermediate rent-case as R  2t   t given (6)
results in a net benet of 2
3
R. Recall that since rent seeking now involves all
three parties, transfers as a share of rents are lower in the triopoly case than
in the duopoly case; t < d. This fact, together with lower prots under
conict, increase the incumbents incentives to stick to the transfer program.
Adhering to the program gives the incumbent a net present value of prots
given by:
t =
1
1  
 
R  2t : (10)
Deviating from the promise now gives the incumbent discounted prots of:
tdev = R +

1  
t: (11)
It is straightforward to demonstrate that:
tdev = 
t ,  = 1
4
 t: (12)
Hence, we can conclude that:
Lemma 3 For high rents (R > Rt), for all   t the transfer program is
credible, resulting in an equilibrium with social stability. For  < t, the
program is not credible and will be rejected, leading to (triopoly) conict.
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3 Analysis
3.1 Conict and peace
The key nding of our analysis is that although resource rents induce conict
by creating more challenge to the incumbent, encouraged entry by more
opposition groups could also bring stability by making a peaceful transfer
program credible. Hence, the main result, namely that "greed can bring
peace", can be stated as:
Proposition 1 There exist levels of  for which an increase in resource rents
leads to a change in equilibrium from conict to peace. The change occurs as
the (threat of) entry of more rent-seeking groups makes the transfer program
credible, and thereby capable of sustaining a peaceful solution.
Proof. This follows immediately from the observation that t < d, together
with Lemmas 2 and 3.
Given intermediate levels of patience, dened by  2  t; d, we know
that for low levels of rent R < Rd, the incumbent is unchallenged, and there
is peace. An increase in rents up to Rt instigates conict, with the intensity
of conict, captured by qd, increasing in R. For large enough rents R >
Rt, potential entry by more contestants promotes cooperation and results in
peace. In this way, the same forces that bring about conict, namely the
greedof rent-seeking groups, can also shift the equilibrium from conict
to peace. Thus, our model can be said to represent a synthesis between the
rent-seeking view of resource wealth as a source of conict and the rentier
state view as resource wealth a source of patronage, stability, and peace. We
also observe that
Corollary 1 For high levels of patience, dened by  > d, there is never
conict. For low levels of rent R < Rd, the incumbent is unchallenged.
For intermediate and high levels of rent R  Rd, the incumbent pacies the
opposition with patronage employment.
and
Corollary 2 For low levels of patience, dened by  < t, there is always
conict for intermediate and high levels of rent R  Rd. For low levels of
rent R < Rd, the incumbent is not challenged.
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Figure 1 illustrates the equilibria of the model.5
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2/3
Figure 1: Rents, patience, conict and peace
The most interesting feature of Figure 1 is the case of intermediate levels
of patience, where an increase in rents starting from a low level leads to
conict as we move into the range of intermediate rents, and then to peace
as we move into high rents. This occurs due to the change in the conict
structure. In other words, patronage employment is credible if the alternative
is triopoly conict, whereas it is not credible and rejected if duopoly is the
outside option.
3.2 Aggregate income
We now use the model to look at the e¤ect of increased rents on aggregate
income Ik, which is the sum of private earnings from the productive sector
and total resource rent revenues. Superscript k = P1; C; P2 stands for peace
without transfers, duopoly conict, and peace with transfers, respectively.
5In Figure 1, w = 14 .
10
When the incumbent is unchallenged, government revenues are R, while each
opposition group earns private sector income w:
IP1 = R + 2w: (13)
When duopoly conict is the equilibrium outcome, each ghting party
makes a prot d = 1
4
R, whereas the opposition group not involved in conict
earns the private sector income w:
IC =
1
2
R + w; (14)
Finally, when a peaceful equilibrium is sustained by (unproductive) pa-
tronage employment, aggregate income is equivalent to total available re-
source rents in the economy:
IP2 = R: (15)
Figure 2 illustrates how aggregate income varies with resource rents, for
 2  t; d.6 We also illustrate the income gap, dened as aggregate income
minus potential income under peace and a fully active productive sector given
by equation (13).
To sum up, given intermediate levels of patience  2  t; d, aggregate
income for low rents R < Rd equals IP1 in equation (13) since the incumbent
is unchallenged and the private sector fully active. For intermediate rents
R 2  Rd; Rt, aggregate income drops to half of its potential level IC given by
(14), due to resources wasted in conict and the reallocation of one groups
activities from the productive to the unproductive sector. Finally, for high
rents R > Rt, aggregate income jumps to IP2 in (15) as conict is prevented
and the productive sector shuts down.
The fall in aggregate income due to increased rents in our model is an
example of the resource curse (Sachs and Warner, 2001, Hodler, 2005). How-
ever, the present paper also shows that resources can be as much a blessing as
a curse: By giving credibility to a transfer program, increased rents can pre-
vent rent seeking and thereby increase aggregate income in society, as shown
by the move from the intermediate-rents to the high-rents regime. This can
be seen in Figure 2 from the fact that as rents increase from intermediate
to highat Rt, aggregate income jumps from IC = 5:5w to IP2 = 9w due
to the prevention. While IP2 is necessarily higher IC , it is still lower than its
potential level due to the transfer program which ties the opposition groups
to the unproductive government sector.
6In Figure 2, w = 1.
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Figure 2: Income and rents
4 Extensions
4.1 Polarization
So far, we have assumed that the interest groups only care about income.
But the literature on conict also points to social tensions, based on ethno-
linguistic or religious di¤erences, as sources of conict. The empirical evi-
dence is mixed. For instance, while Collier and Hoe­ er in earlier work found
a hump shaped relationship between fractionalization and the risk of conict,
in their newer work (Collier, Hoe­ er, Rohner, 2009) they nd the e¤ect of
fractionalization on conict to be monotonically increasing. However, Fearon
and Laitin (2003) argue that factors such as poverty and political instability
rather than ethnicity explain civil war.
One reason why the empirical evidence is not clear on this issue could
be that ethno-linguistic or religious diversity under some conditions promote
conict and under other conditions discourages conict. It is straightforward
to demonstrate that this is a likely outcome of incorporating social tensions
in the present model. Assume that groups experience a disutility from being
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ruled, based on, say, the exposure to social or cultural policies which do
not harmonize with the ideals of the opposition groups. Assume that the
disutility is symmetric across groups, and given by . The higher is , the
more polarized is society. The group in power implements its preferred policy
and experiences a zero policy-loss.
Groups now ght not only for the ability to control rents, but also to
control policies. The payo¤ from duopoly rent seeking in this case needs to
be modied to ^d = 1
4
(R + ), implying that for w > ^d ) R < 4w   , the
incumbent faces no opposition. Similarly, triopoly rent seeking gives payo¤
^t = 1
9
(R + ), with w < ^t ) R < 9w   .
In Figure 1, introducing  > 0 implies a leftward shift in the two vertical
lines, from R = 4w to R = 4w   , and from R = 9w to R = 9w  
. Interestingly, for the levels of patience of our interest  2  t; d, we
observe that the e¤ect of polarization on conict depends on the level of
resource rents. For low levels of rent, increased polarization increases the
likelihood of conict. This is because the added social tensions makes it
more attractive for the opposition groups to challenge the incumbent. And
since the incumbent cannot o¤er a credible patronage employment program
to pacify the opposition, duopoly rent seeking will result. For higher levels
of rent, on the other hand, increased polarization has the opposite e¤ect,
reducing the likelihood of conict. It does so by making triopoly rent seeking
sustainable for lower levels of resource rents, which in turn lends credibility
to the transfer program and hence leads to a peaceful equilibrium.
4.2 Fractionalization
In the above analysis, we have considered a situation with only two opposition
groups. What happens if there are more than two opposition groups in the
society? We can interpret an increase in the number of groups as increased
fractionalization. Let n be the number of groups. Clearly, the more opposi-
tion groups, the more expensive is the patronage employment scheme for the
incumbent. For instance, when the relevant rent seeking market structure is
duopoly, i.e., for t < w < d, the incumbent has to make total transfers of
(n  1) d to prevent conict. The critical level of  above which the transfer
program is credible is now:
ddev = 
d (n),  = 1
3
(n  1)  d (n) ; (16)
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which reduces to d in (9) for n = 3. Note that d (n) is increasing in n:
The more groups in society, the more likely is conict in equilibrium.
Indeed, n = 4 ) d (n) = 1 implies that there will be conict even in the
absence of discounting. The same logic applies for the case of triopoly rent
seeking, etc. Still, while fractionalization makes conict more likely, the core
mechanism highlighted in this paper survives: An increase in rents such that
the market structure of conict changes, may switch the equilibrium from
conict to peace by making the transfer program credible.
5 Conclusion
We have built a simple theoretical model to show that resource rents can have
complex e¤ects on conict in society. Increasing rents starting at a low level
can change the scenario from an unchallenged dictatorship to conict, as the
rent seeking market structure changes from monopoly to duopoly. While the
incumbent would like to prevent conict per se, the patronage employment
transfer program that would pacify the opposition is not self sustained, and
hence not e¤ective. Increased rents given this market structure intensies
the rent seeking contest.
This may change radically as the increase in rent changes the rent seeking
market structure. At some point, increased rents will attract more rent
seekers. By making conict more costly to the incumbent, and by reducing
the share of rents needed for transfers required to pacify the opposition, the
transfer program could now be self sustained, ensuring a peaceful solution.
In this way, increased rents, starting from a higher level, may promote peace.
In other words, the greed mechanism can itself trigger stability in states that
are highly dependent on resource rents.
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